The presence of a large uninsured population may create incentives to providers that affect the care delivered to all individuals in a health care market. Using Current Population Survey data on uninsurance rates and hospital discharge data on Medicare beneficiaries, this study investigates the relationship between the uninsurance rate at the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) level and inpatient quality of care delivered to Medicare beneficiaries, as measured by mortality from eight procedures and conditions. The results do not indicate large or widespread negative effects of the uninsured on Medicare beneficiaries. However, some evidence suggests that the relationship between the local uninsurance rate and Medicare mortality does vary by market size.
The presence of a large uninsured population may create incentives to providers that affect the care delivered to all individuals in a health care market. Using Current Population Survey data on uninsurance rates and hospital discharge data on Medicare beneficiaries, this study investigates the relationship between the uninsurance rate at the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) level and inpatient quality of care delivered to Medicare beneficiaries, as measured by mortality from eight procedures and conditions. The results do not indicate large or widespread negative effects of the uninsured on Medicare beneficiaries. However, some evidence suggests that the relationship between the local uninsurance rate and Medicare mortality does vary by market size.
For at least two decades, the issue of a large and growing uninsured population has been at the forefront of health policy research. Studies have generally focused on the correlates and likely causes of uninsurance, as well as how being uninsured affects health, health care access, utilization, and expenditures. At the individual level, the conclusions are relatively clear. Lack of insurance results in limited access to care, which can lead to poor health outcomes and costly financial consequences for uninsured people (Hadley 2003) .
At the market level, however, the impact of a large uninsured population is less obvious. While the uninsured themselves are likely to have limited access to care and poor outcomes, the insured population may also experience some spillover effects of a high local uninsurance rate. Low demand from a large uninsured population may change the incentives for providers to offer particular services or alter the distribution of services across patients with different types of coverage. High uncompensated care costs for the uninsured also may put financial pressure on providers, and ultimately result in spillover effects to insured individuals at the provider or market level.
In a multi-payer system such as exists in the United States, the entire distribution of insurance coverage affects the equilibrium levels of access, cost, and quality for all people. Thus the uninsured population may have a variety of spillover effects on insured members of their community; such effects have been largely neglected in studies on the consequences of uninsurance. This study explores one potential spillover effect by focusing on how the local uninsurance rate affects inpatient mortality for Medicare beneficiaries.
Previous Literature
It is well known that the insurance distribution varies widely across areas, particularly in the proportions who are uninsured and those with Medicaid and managed care coverage (Kenney et al. 2009; Cunningham and Ginsburg 2001; Dranove, Simon, and White 1998) , and a number of studies have investigated the implications of such variation. Finkelstein (2007) found that the introduction of Medicare had significant effects on the market beyond its effects on Medicare beneficiaries, while several studies have documented spillover effects of market-level HMO penetration on Medicare costs, utilization, and outcomes (Baker 1999; Shen 2003; Bundorf et al. 2004) .
A small body of work has recently developed on the spillover effects of the uninsured more specifically. In A Shared Destiny: Community Effects of Uninsurance, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) suggests that communities with higher rates of uninsurance may face access, cost, or quality problems, and that such concerns may be felt by the insured, as well as the uninsured, when both groups share the same providers (IOM 2003) . Building on the IOM concept, recent work by Pauly (2006, 2007) examined the relationship between local uninsurance rates and measures of unmet need for insured and uninsured individuals. They found that insured, but not uninsured, individuals in communities with high levels of uninsurance have more trouble accessing care than those in communities where uninsurance rates are lower. They also found that perceived quality of care by both doctors and consumers is lower in areas with higher levels of uninsurance. More recent work by Gresenz and Escarce (2011) found further evidence of negative spillover effects on access to care and satisfaction with care for both the privately insured and Medicare beneficiaries. A study by Sabik (2012) , however, found no evidence of negative spillover effects on the insured population when examining the effects of changes in uninsurance rates over time.
In this study, I investigate the effect of the local uninsurance rate on mortality for Medicare beneficiaries. A significant limitation of much of the previous work on the spillover effects of uninsurance is its examination of the impact on all insured individuals, without regard for their specific sources of coverage. Using the Medicare population to study spillover effects, however, allows for a sample of insured individuals with more uniform coverage across markets and limits the need to account for often unobservable, individuallevel coverage characteristics. This study also adds to the existing literature by concentrating on mortality outcomes, which provide a more objective measure of quality of care, compared to self-reported measures of unmet need or satisfaction with care. Further, this study includes analyses that use the variation in uninsurance rates both across areas and over time to identify the effects on mortality, expanding upon the cross-sectional analyses in most of the existing literature. It also considers the potential variation in any spillover effects by market size.
With the passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) and the impending implementation of its major coverage expansion provisions, this study is also particularly relevant. More than 30 million people are expected to gain insurance coverage if the ACA is fully implemented and these individuals are likely to see improved access to care and health outcomes (CBO 2010). However, the dramatic changes in the insurance distribution in markets across the United States also may affect individuals who do not gain coverage through the ACA. This study considers one potential spillover effect by exploring whether covering the uninsured has health benefits for Medicare beneficiaries.
Methods

Conceptual Framework
For spillover effects to emerge, the incentives created by one payer must result in changes in the care provided to patients covered by other payers. This may occur when such incentives affect a component of care that is shared by all patients, such as the nurse staffing of a hospital unit or the availability of an intensive care unit. Glazer and McGuire (2002) explicitly examined the effect of a mix of privatepay and Medicare patients on the common quality of care delivered by a provider and found that a mix of payers leads to a compromise by the provider on the shared level of quality. Glied and Zivin (2002) considered the effects of managed care incentives on physicians caring for both managed care and fee-for-service (FFS) patients. Their work suggests that providers choose elements of quality that are shared by all payers as well as those that are unique to each individual payer. They found evidence that an increase in the proportion of patients with managed care resulted in a decrease in shared quality, as measured by the length of an office visit. They also found, however, that payer-specific quality, as measured by the number of prescriptions, increased for both managed care and FFS patients in the presence of a larger managed care population. The total quality delivered to an individual patient thus reflects both shared and payer-specific quality components.
Individuals choose to obtain health insurance if the expected benefits of the insurance exceed the costs subject to budget constraints. Thus, individuals who remain uninsured are often those with weak preferences for coverage, or those facing high premiums relative to income. But whether it is due to an inherently low demand for health care or to the high out-of-pocket costs faced by the uninsured, those without coverage use less care than their insured counterparts (IOM 2009). Having a large uninsured population in the health care market therefore can lower the total market demand for a variety of services. Such a shift in market demand may affect the care available to all payers if there is not sufficient demand available for spreading the fixed costs of a large investment in quality, such as the purchase of a high-cost imaging device (IOM 2009). High levels of uncompensated care for the uninsured may further reduce incentives to invest in costly quality improvements and result in negative spillover effects on shared quality. If, however, providers adjust the payer-specific components of care delivered to individual patients to compensate for a reduction in shared quality, the negative spillover effects from having a large uninsured population may be mitigated. So, while the uninsured are expected to have a negative impact on shared elements of quality, the ultimate effect of a large uninsured population on total quality for Medicare beneficiaries is ambiguous.
This suggests that spillover effects most likely occur on health care services where shared quality represents a significant component of total quality. Hospital care would meet this requirement because hospitals serve patients of multiple payers and many elements of quality are shared, including the nursing staff and the availability of diagnostic technologies. Within the hospital, those conditions or procedures that require highly specialized services or benefit from large fixed-cost investments may be more likely to experience spillover effects. For example, surgical procedures may be more likely than medical conditions to experience spillover effects due to the need for the specialized skills of surgeons and their teams, as well as the need for access to an operating room. Such shared resources may be more limited in the presence of a large uninsured population. Moreover, since Medicare patients represent a large proportion of all hospital admissions, any spillover effects of the uninsured at the hospital level would likely be felt by this population.
Thus, this study examines the effects of a large uninsured population on hospital quality delivered to Medicare beneficiaries and uses mortality from a variety of procedures and conditions to measure total quality. While quality is difficult to measure, the use of mortality rates is consistent with many other studies on hospital quality and provides an objective measure in contrast to previous work on spillover effects using self-reported quality indicators (Gaskin et al. 2008; Jha et al. 2007; Kessler and Geppert 2005; McClellan and Staiger 1999; Mutter, Wong, and Goldfarb 2008) .
The presence of negative spillover effects from a large uninsured population is also likely to vary based on the characteristics of the market. In larger markets, for instance, where sufficient demand exists to support a wide variety of services and cover their fixed costs, we would expect to see fewer negative spillover effects from a large uninsured population. Furthermore, if multiple providers in large markets differentiate themselves in response to the payer distribution in the market, negative spillover effects of the uninsured may be diminished. If uninsured patients are concentrated among a few safetynet hospitals, for instance, and Medicare beneficiaries do not share these providers, spillover effects are likely to be limited. In small markets with few hospitals, however, the sharing of providers by the entire distribution of payers is more likely to produce spillover effects.
Empirical Approach
The conceptual framework thus leads to an ambiguous hypothesis as to the effect of the uninsurance rate on total quality, as measured by mortality, due to the potential for impacts on both shared and payer-specific elements of quality. I use two alternative approaches to estimate the effects of the uninsurance rate on mortality for Medicare beneficiaries. In the first, I identify the effects of the local uninsurance rate on mortality using data on multiple years of variation in uninsurance between markets, while controlling for trends over time. The second approach exploits the variation in local uninsurance rates within markets over time using market-level fixed effects.
I estimate the models with and without fixed effects because both provide important insights about the relationship between the local uninsurance rate and the quality of care delivered to Medicare beneficiaries. Models without fixed effects rely on the variation across markets and reflect a long-run equilibrium in the relationship between uninsurance and Medicare mortality. However, these models are subject to potential bias due to unobservable market-level characteristics correlated with uninsurance rates and Medicare outcomes. Fixed-effects models rely on the variation in uninsurance rates within markets over time and thus control for unobservable time-invariant market characteristics that may affect mortality. This reduces the potential for biased estimates resulting from the fact that markets with high uninsurance rates may have worse health outcomes, but these models may not fully reflect the response to uninsurance changes over a relatively short period.
I estimate discharge-level logistic regression models using individual inpatient mortality from a variety of conditions as the dependent variable. I use metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) as the markets of interest and limit the analysis to the 100 MSAs with sufficient sample size to reliably estimate uninsurance rates. Because this analysis is conducted at the discharge level, but the independent variable of interest is measured at the market level, standard errors are clustered at the MSA level.
The study's models take the following two forms:
where Y ijmt is a binary indicator of inpatient mortality from one of eight procedures or conditions for patient i in hospital j and market m at time t. P ijmt is a vector of personlevel characteristics including age, sex, race, disability status, and indicators for 30 comorbidities designed to control for patient risk (Elixhauser et al. 1998 ). H jmt is a set of hospital characteristics including hospital ownership, size, teaching and specialty status, as well as the proportion of Medicare and Medicaid discharges at the hospital level. Market-level controls (M mt ) include the local rates of Medicare and Medicaid coverage as well as the per capita income, the number of hospitals in the area, and the proportions black, Hispanic and other race in the market. Model 1 includes indicators for census region, while model 2 includes MSA-level fixed effects (c m ), and both models control for trends over time (t t ).
The variable of interest in all models is the MSA-level uninsurance rate, U mt . By including controls for market-level Medicaid and Medicare coverage, the effects of the uninsurance rate can be interpreted as the effects of an increase in uninsurance at the expense of private coverage in the market. Separate models are estimated on MSAs with above and below the median population in our sample markets (approximately 1 million residents) due to expected differences in spillover effects by market size.
Data
As noted, I use MSAs to approximate health care markets in this analysis, and estimate MSA-level uninsurance rates employing data from the Current Population Survey (CPS). This market definition was selected primarily due to the limited availability of data on local insurance rates, but the MSA has been used in other market-level studies of hospital behavior (Chernew 1995; Horwitz and Nichols 2007) . By pooling two years of CPS data and limiting the sample to the 100 MSAs with the largest sample sizes, at least 400 observations are used to estimate the uninsurance rate in each MSA. 1 I use data from the March CPS supplements and pool data from the periods 2000-2001, 2002-2003, and 2004-2005 . The distribution of uninsurance rates across markets and over time is shown in Table 1 .
The first panel shows the distribution of uninsurance rates across the sample markets in each year and for the pooled sample of markets in all years. The data reveal substantial variation across markets with the fifth percentile in the pooled sample equal to 8.3% and the 95 th percentile equal to 25%. I also consider how the uninsurance rate varies across small and large markets. Again, substantial variation exists across markets of both sizes, with larger markets exhibiting a higher median uninsurance rate in each year, as well as higher levels of uninsurance at all points in the distribution.
The second panel of Table 1 displays the distribution of the change in the uninsurance rate within each market over the period 2001 to 2005. Again, the data show considerable variation across markets. From 2001 to 2005, the median growth in the uninsurance rate was 1.6 percentage points, but at the fifth percentile there is a decline in the uninsurance rate of three percentage points and an increase of 5.2 percentage points at the 95 th percentile. The median growth in uninsurance in large markets was two percentage points from 2001 to 2005, compared to a median growth of 1.1 percentage points in smaller markets. The data therefore indicate that there was considerable variation in the uninsurance rate, both across areas and over time, to identify the effects on mortality in our models.
Community hospitals, defined as nonfederal, short-term, general, and specialty hospitals, present in the markets of interest at three points in time (2001/2002, 2003/2004, 2005/2006) were identified on the American Hospital Association (AHA) annual surveys; the Medicare discharges from these hospitals then were identified on the Medicare Provider Analysis and Review (MEDPAR) data. For each period, two years of discharges (2001/ 2002, 2003/2004, 2005/2006 ) from these hospitals were pooled to increase the sample size for less common conditions. The MED-PAR data used in this analysis included all Medicare discharges from the sample hospitals in each year. 2 The MEDPAR data provide information on patient demographics and the necessary diagnosis and procedure codes for identifying our quality measures, while the AHA data provide hospital characteristics including ownership, size, teaching status, and the proportion of discharges from public payers. Additional MSA-level data were collected from the Area Resource File (ARF) and used to capture demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the sample markets.
I measured hospital quality using inpatient mortality rates for Medicare beneficiaries from a variety of conditions. The conditions were chosen from the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) Inpatient Quality Indicators (IQIs). These identify a variety of measures on which outcomes vary across hospitals even after controlling for patient mix (AHRQ 2007) . Eight conditions that are relatively common among the elderly were chosen from among the AHRQ IQIs. 3 These include: coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) surgery, craniotomy, acute myocardial infarction (AMI), congestive heart failure (CHF), stroke, gastrointestinal (GI) hemorrhage, hip fracture, and pneumonia. Table 2 displays descriptive statistics on the mortality rates for Medicare beneficiaries in the sample markets, by quartile of the local uninsurance rate. The uninsurance rate quartiles reflect the distribution of uninsurance rates from a pooled sample, with three observations for each of the sample markets reflecting the uninsurance rate in 2000-2001, 2002-2003, and 2004-2005 . Across all markets, the data suggest that Medicare beneficiaries in markets with the highest uninsurance rates were more likely to die from CABG surgery, AMI, GI hemorrhage, and pneumonia than those in markets with the lowest uninsurance rates. However, on the other half of the measures, those in markets with the highest uninsurance rates were less likely to die than those living in markets with the lowest uninsurance rates. In smaller markets, the relationship between the uninsurance rate and Medicare mortality appears slightly stronger. Mortality rates in the highest quartile of uninsurance were as large as, or larger than, those in the lowest quartile for six measures. The results in larger markets were similar to those in all markets. While the descriptive data do not suggest a strong linear relationship between the local uninsurance rate and mortality for Medicare beneficiaries, these data do not account for numerous confounding factors. Table 3 describes the analysis sample and considers the association between the covariates used in my models and the local uninsurance rate. 4 The results suggest that markets with high levels of uninsurance also tend to have higher levels of Medicaid coverage and lower levels of Medicare coverage. Areas with high uninsurance rates tend to be in the South and West and have larger black and Hispanic populations, while those with lower rates tend to be in the Northeast and Midwest and have larger white populations. Markets with higher uninsurance rates also tend to be larger than those with lower rates. Medicare beneficiaries discharged from hospitals in markets with higher uninsurance rates were less likely to be white and more likely to be black or Hispanic than those in low uninsurance rate markets. They also were more likely to be discharged from a for-profit or public hospital, less likely to be discharged from a teaching hospital, and more likely to be discharged from a hospital with more than 300 beds. Furthermore, those in markets with high levels of uninsurance were likely to be discharged from hospitals with a higher proportion of Medicaid discharges and a lower proportion of Medicare discharges.
These descriptive characteristics varied somewhat between smaller and larger markets.
Beneficiaries in smaller markets, for example, were more likely to be white and to be discharged from a for-profit hospital than those in larger markets (not shown). However, the patterns observed across the quartiles of uninsurance were similar in small and large markets and consistent with those discussed for all markets. Table 4 displays the marginal effect of the local uninsurance rate on each measure of Medicare mortality, which reflects the change in the probability of death associated with a one-percentage-point increase in the local uninsurance rate. Columns 1 to 3 display the results from models that do not include market-level fixed effects and thus identify the effects of uninsurance on mortality using the variation in the uninsurance rate across markets. A positive marginal effect indicates a higher uninsurance rate is associated with a higher probability of death for Medicare patients, or a negative spillover effect of the uninsured. The results for all markets show mixed evidence on the relationship between uninsurance and Medicare mortality (column 1). A positive and marginally significant effect of the uninsurance rate on mortality from CABG surgery indicates a negative spillover effect of the uninsured. However, there is also evidence to suggest that Medicare patients in markets with higher uninsurance rates are less likely to die from a stroke or pneumonia. The effect of the uninsurance rate is not statistically significant on the remaining five measures, but the sign of the effect is negative on four of the five. Stratifying the sample by market size yields somewhat different results. Among smaller MSAs (column 2), the sign on the effect of uninsurance is positive for each of the eight measures, indicating that higher uninsurance rates are associated with higher probability of death for Medicare beneficiaries. However, none of these effects is statistically significant. The results in larger markets are similar to the results in all markets in sign and significance (column 3). There is a stronger positive effect of the local uninsurance rate on mortality from CABG surgery, and negative and significant effects on stroke and pneumonia. Two additional measures also show negative and marginally significant effects of the uninsurance rate on craniotomy and hip fracture mortality. In fact, with the exception of CABG, the results in larger markets are more negative and more significant than in all markets combined, which further reflects the positive relationship found between the uninsurance rate and mortality in small markets.
Results
Due to concerns that areas with higher levels of uninsurance might have unobservable characteristics that could be correlated with Medicare outcomes and thus bias the results, I estimated models using MSA-level fixed effects to identify the effect of local uninsurance rates on Medicare outcomes using the change in the local uninsurance rate over time (columns 4 to 6). Among all markets, there is no evidence of a negative spillover effect from the uninsured to Medicare beneficiaries (column 4). The sign on the effect of uninsurance on Medicare mortality is negative for seven measures, but only the effect on AMI mortality is statistically significant. This indicates that Medicare beneficiaries in markets with a larger increase in the uninsurance rate over time were less likely to die of a heart attack.
Again, the results vary by market size. In smaller markets, a positive and marginally significant effect of the uninsurance rate on craniotomy mortality suggests some evidence of a negative spillover effect of the uninsured (column 5). The effects are not statistically significant for any other measure, but unlike in the models without fixed effects, most are negative in sign, indicating less evidence of a positive association between the uninsurance rate and death for Medicare beneficiaries. In large markets, again there is some significant evidence of positive spillover effects of the uninsured to Medicare beneficiaries. The effect of the uninsurance rate on mortality is negative for all eight measures, indicating that those in markets with stronger growth in uninsurance have a lower probability of death. The effects on AMI, stroke, and craniotomy are statistically significant at least at the 10% level.
It is important to note that the magnitude of the effect of the uninsurance rate is very small for all outcomes and all specifications. For example, the results in column 1 indicate that a relatively large 10-percentage-point increase in the uninsurance rate is associated with an increase in the probability of death from CABG surgery of only .5 percentage points. Thus, regardless of statistical significance, the results do not suggest particularly meaningful changes in the probability of death associated with an increase in the uninsurance rate.
Discussion and Limitations
This study explores the market-level effects of local uninsurance rates on the quality of care for Medicare beneficiaries. The conceptual framework suggests a variety of ways in which the uninsured might affect Medicare outcomes. While we expect negative effects of a large uninsured population on elements of shared quality, such as high-cost diagnostic technologies or nurse staffing, we also expect that payer-specific quality improvements may compensate for any such reductions. Thus, the expected effect of the uninsurance rate on total quality, as measured by mortality, is ambiguous.
Overall, the results indicate no large or widespread negative spillover effects of the uninsured population on mortality for Medicare beneficiaries. The evidence from models without market fixed effects suggests, however, that the effects do vary by market size. Smaller markets show a positive, though not statistically significant, association between the local uninsurance rate and Medicare mortality. This is consistent with the concept that a large uninsured population can result in reductions in shared quality for all patients. Negative spillover effects may be more likely among small markets because if providers in smaller markets face lower market demand, they may have limited ability to spread the fixed costs of shared quality investments. Providers in smaller markets also may be less able to differentiate themselves to serve only a certain segment of the payer distribution. Thus, patients of different payers are more likely to share providers in smaller markets and this increases the likelihood of spillover effects.
However, the evidence for negative spillover effects in smaller markets is not statistically significant and the association is even weaker when controlling for market-level fixed effects. This may indicate that unobservable market characteristics correlated with the uninsurance rate and Medicare mortality are contributing to the results in the models without fixed effects. However, it also may suggest that our time period of interest is too short to detect provider responses to a changing insurance landscape. It is interesting to note that the only evidence of a positive association between the uninsurance rate and probability of death in our fixed-effects models is for mortality from craniotomy and stroke in smaller markets. Both are neurological conditions, potentially requiring highly specialized physicians, staff, or equipment. The availability of such specialized care may be at risk in a small market with a high uninsurance rate.
In larger markets, there is no evidence of negative spillover effects from the uninsured, and in fact, there is some evidence of a positive association between a higher uninsurance rate and the survival of Medicare beneficiaries in models with and without fixed effects. These results imply that reductions in shared quality, if present, may be compensated for by payer-specific quality improvements. Glazer and McGuire (2002) suggest one additional explanation of positive spillover effects. They show that, in the presence of fewer private-pay patients, providers will lower the price at which they will accept Medicare beneficiaries. Following this logic, an increase in the uninsurance rate, and a corresponding decrease in the privately insured, have the potential to improve access to care for Medicare beneficiaries. Such improved access could then result in better outcomes for Medicare beneficiaries in the presence of more uninsured, as some of our findings suggest. Also, if providers in large markets respond to a large uninsured population by further differentiating themselves and improving quality in order to attract more generous payers, Medicare beneficiaries using such providers may reap these benefits. The strong presence of for-profit hospitals in markets with high uninsurance rates may be evidence of this phenomenon.
This study has a number of limitations as well as several potential extensions. The major limitations involve the market-level uninsurance measure. First, the uninsurance rate was measured using survey data and the data are not designed to be representative at the local level. This introduces potentially substantial measurement error into the analysis. Because the identifying variation in my models may contain considerable noise, this creates bias against finding any effects of the uninsurance rate on mortality. Other analyses address similar concerns by using model weights based on the standard error of the measure in question (Shen 2003) . I did not pursue such an approach here because it would diminish the importance of the smallest markets, which is where I expected spillover effects to be strongest.
Second, the uninsurance measure may be correlated with unobservable market characteristics that are also correlated with Medicare outcomes. For example, I am unable to control for the presence of supplemental coverage for Medicare beneficiaries. Assuming that Medicare beneficiaries in areas with larger uninsured populations have lower incomes and have less supplemental coverage, and that supplemental coverage improves outcomes, this could bias the results toward finding a negative spillover effect on mortality. While the models using market-level fixed effects can partially address endogeneity concerns, unobservable market characteristics that change over time could still result in biased estimates.
An instrumental variable (IV) approach is another option for dealing with endogeneity bias, but this approach requires identifying an appropriate instrument that is correlated with the uninsurance rate, but uncorrelated with Medicare mortality. This would be a particularly challenging task in this study since I also included local estimates of coverage by Medicaid and Medicare in the models. These are important for isolating the role of the uninsurance rate, but could also be endogenous. An IV approach therefore would require at least three appropriate instruments to adequately address the potential endogeneity bias. Thus, I did not pursue an IV analysis, but two recent studies of the spillover effects of community uninsurance rates provide support for my approach. When Gresenz and Escarce (2011) used an IV approach, they found their standard estimates to be unbiased in most cases, and Sabik (2012) also found IV estimates to be similar to standard estimates.
Finally, in my efforts to reduce the measurement error in the uninsurance rates, my sample was limited to 100 relatively large MSAs. As predictions indicated, however, I expected to see any negative spillover effects of a large uninsured population more prominently in smaller markets. Currently, data are available from the American Community Survey (ACS) that allow for representative estimates of uninsurance at a much finer level of geographic detail. Using this data to perform a similar analysis would be a natural extension of this or other work on market-level insurance effects.
Overall, this analysis does not point to a significant negative externality being imposed on the Medicare population by the uninsured in their communities. It does suggest, however, that any effects of the local uninsurance rate may vary by market size. This opens up a line of inquiry regarding the mechanisms behind these results as well as other potential marketlevel effects of insurance. Related work is currently exploring the effects of payer mix on shared elements of quality, such as the availability of high-cost diagnostic technologies and the provision of specialized hospital services (McMorrow 2010) . As preparations to implement the Affordable Care Act continue, it will be important to consider how the expected reductions in uninsurance rates will affect the care delivered in local markets and how this might vary by the types of coverage gained by the newly insured. The results of this analysis do not suggest strong benefits to the Medicare population from a reduction in the uninsurance rate and expansion of private coverage. However, additional analysis should consider the market-level effects of a significant expansion of public coverage, which is likely to occur in many markets as a result of the ACA Medicaid expansion.
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1 Ten MSAs have uninsurance rates generated from a sample of between 400 and 700 observations, 16 MSAs use a sample of between 700 and 1,000 observations, 50 MSA use a sample of between 1,000 and 3,000 observations, and the remaining 24 MSAs use of sample of more than 3,000 observations. The elderly are not excluded from the denominator of the uninsurance rate. 2 The use of the 100% MEDPAR files is particularly important for this analysis because it is unclear whether the MEDPAR sample files would be representative at the MSA level. 3 I exclude mortality from abdominal aortic aneurysm repair, esophageal resection, and pancreatic resection because of small samples among the elderly. I also exclude mortality from hip replacement because, while hip replacement is common among the elderly, it has an extremely low probability of death (.3% in 2001-2002) . 4 Note that the descriptive statistics presented here include all Medicare discharges from the sample hospitals, but not for those discharges with the specific conditions I analyze. The distribution of comorbidities in the analysis sample can be found in the Appendix Table. ? Appendix 
